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Abstract
Lotteries are introduced into Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) [2], a version of Trejos and Wright (1995) [4]
with aggregate shocks. Lotteries improve welfare and eliminate the two notable features of the optimum
with deterministic trades: over-production and history-dependence. Moreover, the optimum can be sup-
ported by buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Cavalcanti and Erosa [2] (CE, hereafter) study optima in a version of Trejos and Wright [4].
They introduce into it i.i.d. aggregate shocks to preferences, shocks with a two-point support.
They show that for an interval of intermediate magnitudes for the discount factor, the ex ante op-
timum over all individually rational (IR) and deterministic trades displays two properties: output
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is higher than the first-best when the shock is such that the first-best output is low and there is
history-dependence—that is, promised utilities play a role. We show that if lotteries are allowed,
then higher ex ante utility is achieved and neither property holds at an optimum.2
The role of lotteries in the CE setting is easily explained. Consider the situation in which
the shock is such that the first-best level of output is high and in which the planner would like
to weaken the seller IR constraint by making the current acquisition of money more valuable.
Absent lotteries, CE achieve that by promising the current seller more output than the first-best
in the future when he is a buyer and the shock is such that the first-best level of output is low.3
With lotteries, the current acquisition of money can be made more valuable by having the buyer
surrender money with some probability in that future situation.
2. Model
The model is [2] except that lotteries are allowed in trade. Time is discrete, dated as t  0,
and there is a unit nonatomic measure of agents. At the beginning of every period, the economy
is hit by an aggregate shock s with support {l, h}, low or high, which, as described below, affects
preferences. The shock s is i.i.d. over time and the probability of state s is πs(> 0).
Each agent maximizes the discounted sum of expected utility with discount factor β ∈ (0,1).
At each date, if an agent produces y  0 amount of good, the utility cost is y. If an agent con-
sumes y  0 amount of good when the current state is s, the period utility he gets is us(y),
where us :R+ →R is differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies us(0) = 0,
u′s(0) = ∞ and u′s(∞) = 0. We also assume that us is bounded, above by u¯, and that u′l < u′h.4
Define the first-best output levels by y∗s ≡ arg max{us(y) − y} or u′s(y∗s ) = 1. That is, the first-
best output maximizes the sum of utilities of the consumer and the producer. It follows that
y∗l < y∗h .
In each period, after the aggregate state is observed, agents are randomly matched in pairs.
With probability 1/N , an agent is a consumer, with probability 1/N , the agent is a producer, and
with probability 1 − 2/N , the match is a no-coincidence meeting, where N  2.
There exists a fixed stock of indivisible, perfectly durable money, the per capita amount of
which is denoted m ∈ (0,1). Individual money holdings are restricted to {0,1}. In meetings,
agents’ money holdings are observable, but any other information about an agent’s trading history
is private.
3. The planner’s problem and the solution
We study the mechanism-design problem studied by CE; the planner chooses an allocation to
maximize welfare subject to a notion of implementability.
The realization of the date-t aggregate shock is denoted st and a history up to date t is de-
noted st ≡ (s0, s1, . . . , st ). Let St ≡ {s0} × {l, h}t denote the set of possible histories up to date t
2 Berentsen, Molico and Wright [1] are the first to introduce lotteries into matching models of money.
3 This over-production in turn leads to history-dependence. See Proposition 10 of their paper for details.
4 One way to get the linear cost function and the bounded utility function is as follows: suppose that the utility and
the cost from consuming and producing z amount are given by a possibly unbounded function u˜s (z) and a convex
function c˜(z), respectively. Suppose further that there is a bound z¯ on production in a sense that limz→z¯ c˜(z) = ∞. Then
changing the unit of goods nonlinearly by y ≡ c˜(z) leads to the bounded utility function us(y) ≡ u˜s (c˜−1(y)) and the
linear cost function c(y) ≡ c˜(c˜−1(y)) = y with no bound on y.
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conditional on the initial state s0, and let p(st ) ≡ πs1πs2 · · ·πst , the probability of event st . It is
assumed that the initial state is given and that p(s0) = 1.
An allocation is {y(st ), q(st )}st , where y(st ) ∈ R+ is output (produced by the producer and
consumed by the consumer) and q(st ) ∈ [0,1] is the probability that the consumer transfers
money to the producer.5 The welfare criterion is
∞∑
t=0
∑
st∈St
βtp
(
st
)[
ust
(
y
(
st
))− y(st)], (1)
where us(y) − y is the social gain, or the sum of period utility of the consumer and the pro-
ducer.
Because people can exit a meeting without trade and with no further punishment, the planner is
subject to IR constraints for the producer and for the consumer. In order to state the IR constraints
in a simple way, let vj (st ) denote the expected discounted utility of an individual with money
holdings j ∈ {0,1} after history st and before being matched. These satisfy
v1
(
st
)= 1 − m
N
[
ust
(
y
(
st
))+ q(st)β(πlv0(st , l)+ πhv0(st , h))]
+
(
1 − 1 − m
N
q
(
st
))
β
(
πlv1
(
st , l
)+ πhv1(st , h)), (2)
and
v0
(
st
)= m
N
[−y(st)+ q(st)β(πlv1(st , l)+ πhv1(st , h))]
+
(
1 − m
N
q
(
st
))
β
(
πlv0
(
st , l
)+ πhv0(st , h)). (3)
The IR constraints for the producer and the consumer are expressed as6
y
(
st
)
 q
(
st
)
βR
(
st
)
 ust
(
y
(
st
))
, (4)
where
R
(
st
)≡ πlr(st , l)+ πhr(st , h), (5)
and
r
(
st
)≡ v1(st)− v0(st).
The planner’s problem is as follows.
Definition 1. An allocation {y(st ), q(st )}st is implementable if there exists a sequence
{v0(st ), v1(st )} that satisfies conditions (2)–(4) and vi(st ) ∈ [0, u¯/(1 − β)]. An allocation is
optimal if it maximizes (1) among the set of implementable allocations. An allocation is history-
independent if it depends only on the current state, in which case the allocation is characterized
by four numbers: (yl, ql, yh, qh).
5 Because goods are divisible and agents are risk-averse, lotteries over output do not improve welfare. The proof is
somewhat analogous to Proposition 3 of [1].
6 Expressing IR constraints by using vj implicitly relies upon the principle of one-shot deviation. That principle applies
because there is discounting and us is bounded.
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Our result is
Proposition 1. Let
1
βl
≡ 1 + 1 − m
N
· πl[ul(y
∗
l ) − y∗l ] + πh[uh(y∗l ) − y∗l ]
y∗l
, (6)
1
βh
≡ 1 + 1 − m
N
· πl[ul(y
∗
l ) − y∗l ] + πh[uh(y∗h) − y∗h]
y∗h
. (7)
There is an optimal allocation and it is history-independent. Moreover, 0 < βl < βh < 1 and the
optimal allocation is as follows; if β  βl , then yl = yh  y∗l and ql = qh = 1; if β ∈ (βl, βh),
then yl = y∗l , yh < y∗h , ql < 1 and qh = 1; and finally if β  βh, then yl = y∗l and yh = y∗h .
This differs from CE for intermediate magnitudes for β; state-l output is kept first-best and
lotteries are necessary.7 Moreover, one can see in the proof that the optimum can be supported
by buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers. Hence, the trades are not only IR, but also coalition-proof for
the pairs in meetings.
4. Proof of the proposition
The proof proceeds as follows. First, an upper bound on R(st ) (see (5)) is established. (The
candidate for the upper bound, which depends on β , is provided in Lemma 1. Then, Lemma 2
shows that the candidate is, in fact, an upper bound.) Then, the proposition is proved by con-
structing the optimum in terms of that upper bound.
Lemma 1. Let
g(R;β) ≡ βR + 1 − m
N
[
πl max
0ql1
Hl(qlβR) + πh max
0qh1
Hh(qhβR)
]
,
where Hs(x) ≡ us(x) − x. The function g(·;β) has a unique positive fixed point, denoted R¯(β).
Moreover, βR¯(β) is strictly increasing with βlR¯(βl) = y∗l and βhR¯(βh) = y∗h , which implies
βl < βh.
Proof. Note that
arg max
qs∈[0,1]
Hs(qsβR) =
{
y∗s /βR if βR  y∗s ,
1 otherwise.
It follows that
g(R;β) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
βR + 1−m
N
[πlHl(βR) + πhHh(βR)] if βR  y∗l ,
βR + 1−m
N
[πlHl(y∗l ) + πhHh(βR)] if βR ∈ [y∗l , y∗h],
βR + 1−m
N
[πlHl(y∗l ) + πhHh(y∗h)] if βR  y∗h.
(8)
Therefore, g(R;β) is continuous and strictly increasing in R. Moreover, it follows by direct
computation that ∂g(R;β)/∂R exists, is infinite at R = 0, is weakly decreasing in R, and that
7 It is not hard to show that in the model without aggregate shocks, optima can be attained without the use of lotteries.
In this sense, the CE model is a simple monetary model in which lotteries are necessary.
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∂g(R;β)/∂R = β for R  y∗h/β . Then, g(0;β) = 0 implies that there is a unique R > 0, de-
noted R¯(β), such that R = g(R;β). Also, because g(R;β) is strictly increasing in β for R > 0,
it follows that R¯(β) is strictly increasing in β . Finally, continuity of R¯(β) follows from the
implicit function theorem.
Now consider the equations, βR¯(β) = y∗s . It follows from the above characterization of g that
βR¯(β) → ∞ as β → 1. That, βR¯(β) = 0 at β = 0, and continuity of βR¯(β) imply existence of
a solution. Also, monotonicity of βR¯(β) implies that the solution is unique and increasing in y∗s .
Finally, the closed-form expressions for the βs are obtained by solving the equations y∗s /β =
g(y∗s /β;β) for β . In particular, by (8), for s = l, that equation is
y∗l /β = y∗l +
1 − m
N
[
πlHl
(
y∗l
)+ πhHh(y∗l )],
while for s = h, it is
y∗h/β = y∗h +
1 − m
N
[
πlHl
(
y∗l
)+ πhHh(y∗h)]. 
Lemma 2. If {y(st ), q(st )}st is implementable, then R(st ) R¯(β) for all st .
Proof. For any st−1 and st ,
r
(
st−1, st
)= (1 − m)ust (y(st )) + my(st )
N
+
(
1 − q(s
t )
N
)
βR
(
st
)
 (1 − m)ust (q(s
t )βR(st )) + mq(st )βR(st )
N
+
(
1 − q(s
t )
N
)
βR
(
st
)
= βR(st)+ 1 − m
N
[
ust
(
q
(
st
)
βR
(
st
))− q(st)βR(st)]
 βR
(
st
)+ 1 − m
N
max
0q1
[
ust
(
qβR
(
st
))− qβR(st)]
≡ gs
(
R
(
st
))
, (9)
where the first equality follows from the definition of r(st ) (see (3) and (2)), and the first inequal-
ity from the first inequality in (4), the producer IR constraint. Hence, we have
R
(
st−1
)= πlr(st−1, l)+ πhr(st−1, h)
 πlgl
(
R
(
st−1, l
))+ πhgh(R(st−1, h))
 g
(
max
{
R
(
st−1, l
)
,R
(
st−1, h
)})
,
where the first inequality follows from (9) and the second inequality because gs is increasing.
Therefore,
R
(
st−1
)
 g
(
R
(
st−1, st
))
for either st = l or st = h. (10)
Now, suppose, by way of contradiction, that R(st ) > R¯(β) for some st . Then, by (10), there
exists st+1 such that R(st+1) f (R(st )), where f = g−1. Because f is increasing, by induction
there exists a continuation of st such that R(st+n) f (n)(R(st )) for all n. Moreover, it follows
from the properties of g that f (R(st )) > R(st ) and that f is convex. Therefore, the sequence
R(st+n) is unbounded, which violates the definition of implementability. 
P. Huang, Y. Igarashi / Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 382–388 387
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider, in turn, three exhaustive cases.
Case 1: β  βl .
Consider the allocation (ys, qs) = (βR¯(β),1), s = l, h. By construction, this satisfies the
first inequality in (4). Also, βR¯(β)  y∗l < y∗h (see Lemma 1) implies us(ys) = us(βR¯(β)) 
βR¯(β) = βR¯(β)qs . Therefore, the second inequality in (4) is also satisfied. Hence, this alloca-
tion is implementable.
Now because βR¯(β) y∗l and us(y) − y is increasing in y for y ∈ [0, y∗l ], any better alloca-
tion must have higher production after some history. However, the bound on R(st ) and qs = 1
implies that higher production violates the first inequality in (4).
Case 2: βl < β < βh.
Consider the allocation (yh, qh) = (βR¯(β),1) and (yl, ql) = (y∗l , y
∗
l
βR¯(β)
), where y∗l <
βR¯(β) < y∗h (see Lemma 1) guarantees ql < 1. By construction, this satisfies the first inequality
of (4). Also, ul(yl) = ul(y∗l ) y∗l = βR¯(β)ql , and βR¯(β) y∗h implies uh(yh) = uh(βR¯(β))
βR¯(β) = βR¯(β)qh. Therefore, the second inequality of (4) is also satisfied. Hence, the allocation
is implementable.
Now because βR¯(β) < y∗h and uh(y) − y is increasing in y for y ∈ [0, y∗h], any better alloca-
tion must have higher production after some history st with st = h. (After histories with st = l,
y(st ) = y∗l , so there is no room for improvement.) However, the bound on R(st ) and qh = 1
implies that higher production violates the first inequality in (4).
Case 3: βh  β .
Consider the allocation (ys, qs) = (y∗s , y
∗
s
βR¯(β)
), s = l, h, where y∗l < y∗h  βR¯(β) (see
Lemma 1) guarantees qs  1. By construction, this satisfies the first inequality of (4). Also,
us(ys) = us(y∗s )  y∗s = βR¯(β)qs implies that the second inequality of (4) is satisfied. Hence,
the allocation is implementable. It is optimal because it is first-best.8 
5. The optimal choice of m
Given the result that the optimal allocation is history-independent, we now consider the op-
timal choice of m.9 For that purpose, we now express βs in (6)–(7) and R¯(β) in Lemma 1
as βs(m) and R¯(m,β), respectively, to make explicit their dependence on m. Suppose that the
planner chooses m before the initial shock s0 is realized. The planner maximizes the product
E(m) · I (m,β), where E(m) ≡ m(1 − m)/N , is the frequency of trade meetings, and
I (m,β) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
1−β {πlHl(βR¯(m,β)) + πhHh(βR¯(m,β))} if β < βl(m),
1
1−β {πlHl(y∗l ) + πhHh(βR¯(m,β))} if βl(m) β < βh(m),
1
1−β {πlHl(y∗l ) + πhHh(y∗h)} if βh(m) β.
8 In this range, the outputs are unique but q’s are not. This is similar to what happens in Trejos and Wright for high
discount factor. Here, (ql , qh) is chosen to maximize R(st ), which is equivalent to buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers.
9 Similar discussions are found in previous models without aggregate shock and lotteries: in Trejos and Wright [4],
where consumer and producer have a specific Nash bargaining with equal bargaining powers, and in Cavalcanti and
Wallace [3], where the planner chooses the optimal allocation.
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E(m) is increasing for m < 0.5, a maximum at m = 0.5, and decreasing for m > 0.5, while
I (m,β) is decreasing in m, because the cutoff values βs(m) are increasing and the maximum
return R¯(m,β) is strictly decreasing in m.
One immediate result is that if β  βh(0.5), then the unique optimal quantity is 0.5. Other-
wise, the optimal quantity is less than 0.5, as can be seen from following first-order condition,
a necessary condition for the optimal m:
0 = ∂E
∂m
· I (m) + E(m) · ∂I
∂m
= 1 − 2m
N
· I (m,β) + m(1 − m)
N
· ∂I
∂m
. (11)
The first term, the ‘extensive margin effect,’ is zero at m = 0.5, while the second term, the ‘in-
tensive margin effect,’ is negative at m = 0.5, because ∂I/∂m|m=0.5 < 0 due to β < βh(0.5) and
∂R¯/∂m < 0.
6. Extension to more than two states
The extension of our results to the case of more than two states is straightforward. Let the
support of the preference shock s be {1,2, . . . , d}, where y∗1 < · · · < y∗d . Then, let
1
βs
≡ 1 + 1 − m
N
·
∑
is πiHi(y
∗
i ) +
∑
is+1 πiHi(y∗s )
y∗s
for s = 1, . . . , d . The candidate for the optimal allocation is as follows.
If β ∈ (0, β1] then (yi, qi) = (βR¯,1), i = 1, . . . , d;
if β ∈ [βs,βs+1] then (yi, qi) =
{
(y∗i ,
y∗i
βR¯
), i = 1, . . . , s,
(βR¯,1), i = s + 1, . . . , d;
if β ∈ [βd,1) then (yi, qi) =
(
y∗i ,
y∗i
βR¯
)
, i = 1, . . . , d,
where R¯ = R¯(β) is the unique positive solution to R = g(R;β) and
g(R;β) ≡ βR + 1 − m
N
d∑
s=1
πs max
0qs1
Hs(qsβR).
The proof is essentially the same as that for two states.
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